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INTRODUCTION 
This Essay is about mutual funds. Because of that, it may put 
many to sleep long before we get to the heart of the matter. I en-
courage you right now to stay awake, or at least keep one eye 
propped open. For embedded in this story about mutual funds, 
rent seeking, the challenge of separating the good and the bad, 
and the even greater challenge of respecting autonomy in an en-
vironment where so many choices seem to be bad ones, is the story 
of a judge. That judge is the Honorable Richard A. Posner, aka 
RAP, Dick, Professor Posner, the one to be feared, the one to be 
revered, the one who inspires, the one who causes many to per-
spire, and the one who somehow gets it right even when he is 
wrong (and he is sometimes wrong). It is a story of how he judges. 
It is a story of curiosity and truth seeking. It is a story of respect-
ing process and precedent while not being overly constrained by 
convention or rules. It is also a story of constantly seeing things 
anew, even when that requires letting go of views that seemed 
true when first embraced. It is a story of positionality and insight, 
and law and humanity, and the perfection of embracing imperfec-
tion. It is a story of using stories to help others see, and the power 
and limits of such methods. 
Although this may all sound a little too new-agey to possibly 
be an account of Judge Richard Posner, let me assure you that 
there are reasons to use this type of language to understand who 
he is and how he judged. And let me further assure you that in 
the process of trying to uncloak something new about the brilliant 
and prolific Judge Posner, this Essay will also seek to unmask 
something about how our legal system does and should work. For 
although there will never be another Judge Posner, his approach 
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to judging holds lessons for all of us. I will suggest that much of 
Judge Posner’s depth came not from his remarkable mind but 
from his steadfastness in not allowing the legend that grew up 
around him to blunt his curiosity or contort his view of himself. 
Although not one for false modesty, he conscientiously, even if not 
consciously, avoids living on a cloud. The heart of what makes 
him a legend is less his brilliant intellect than his wisdom. And, 
fortunately for the rest of us, a mind need not be anywhere near 
as sharp as his to learn something from his capacity to hold ten-
sions—humility enabled by utter self-assurance, fairness through 
allowance for difference, transcendence that rests upon and is 
grounded in human fallibility. Most important, for purposes of 
this Essay, was his treatment of the law as a corpus both greater 
than but inherently of the people who make it and in whose ser-
vice it is deployed. 
In a methodology that can be defended only by the meekness 
of the conclusions it supports, this Essay weaves together the evo-
lution of one case with Judge Posner’s writing about judging and 
some personal observations to speculate on why the law needs 
more individuals like Judge Posner. Alongside doing right by lit-
igants in any individual suit, producing “good” law is a critical 
function of the judicial system. Recognizing a particular court’s 
position within a multitiered judicial system, and situating that 
system within a governance regime that imposes frictions on leg-
islative and regulatory action, is critical to assessing what judges 
should and should not do. Given ongoing learning, changing en-
vironments, and the potential for law to take form in the backwa-
ters without anyone focusing on what it should be, the law should 
sometimes evolve. Judges that sit below the top of the hierarchy 
can aid this process by sometimes serving as instigators, flagging 
areas in which the law is ill suited to the task at hand. This is but 
one role and should not always triumph, but also should not be 
ignored. The occasional pragmatic instigator may stir up some 
trouble, but she can also play a critical role in keeping the law 
alive. Allowing some judges some of the time to ask the tough 
questions about what the law is and ought to be even when re-
solving a case is critical to the health of the law. The core claim of 
this Essay is thus a call to embrace instigators as an essential 
element of, rather than an affront to, an effective judiciary. 
On the offhand possibility that you are wondering what any 
of this has to do with mutual funds, let me cut to the chase. The 
backbone of this Essay is a case about whether a mutual fund 
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investment advisor breached a fiduciary duty owed to its inves-
tors by charging too high of a fee for its services.1 This is a tricky 
area of the law, as most actively managed mutual funds charge 
fees in excess of what their returns can justify, and yet investors 
keep buying them. The case was decided by three of Judge 
Posner’s colleagues on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Had 
it not been for Judge Posner, the case likely would have died 
there. But Judge Posner, never one to minimize his workload, 
read that opinion when the lawyers took the often pro forma step 
of seeking a rehearing. And despite (or perhaps because) that 
unanimous opinion had been authored by Frank Easterbrook, 
Judge Posner decided that the reasoning was suspect and that the 
case should be reheard en banc. In a dissent to the denial of rehear-
ing the case en banc, Posner argued that Judge Easterbrook had 
created a circuit split without so acknowledging and that the case 
deserved the attention of the full Seventh Circuit. Although 
Posner convinced only four of his Seventh Circuit colleagues to 
see the case his way, his opinion did get the attention of the 
Supreme Court. The Court granted cert and soundly rejected 
Judge Easterbrook’s approach, albeit in a narrow decision that 
largely reverted the law to where it stood before either Posner or 
Easterbrook got involved. 
With respect to the law governing mutual funds, the Supreme 
Court’s decision was a missed opportunity, but no great tragedy. 
Others have written, in great detail, on the mechanics of mutual 
fund fee litigation and the significance of the various opinions 
rendered in this case.2 The account here addresses these issues, 
but only as a means rather than an end. The Essay instead uses 
this dispute as a lens into lawmaking—the role of courts and par-
ticular judges on those courts; the role of lawyers who bring suits 
and those who defend against them; and the role of Congress, as 
both body and construct, in how judges apply the laws that 
Congress adopts. Following in the spirit of Judge Posner, and 
hence exercising my prerogative to project onto Posner things he 
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might never say himself, I will argue that Judge Posner embodies 
the importance of boldness and individualism to the law and that 
humble pragmatists may be particularly good in this role. 
I.  THE CASE 
A. The Setup 
We live in a world where many actively managed mutual 
funds are a scam. Not in a Bernie Madoff–type way. Most asset 
managers are not fraudsters, and few regulated funds are Ponzi 
schemes. Many mutual fund advisors believe, quite fervently, in 
the value of the work they are doing. Some are even right to be-
lieve that they create value. Nonetheless, the overall picture is 
bleak. Herd behavior is common.3 Professors Eugene Fama and 
Kenneth French found that “on average, active mutual funds do 
not produce gross returns above (or below) those of passive bench-
marks,” which is bad news for investors given the higher fees for 
active funds.4 Another recent study found that “over the 10-year 
investment horizon, 85.36% of large-cap managers, 91.27% of 
mid-cap managers, and 90.75% of small-cap managers failed to 
outperform” the relative benchmark, and the performance was al-
most as bleak when evaluating their performance over shorter 
time horizons.5 And even a recent study suggesting that mutual 
fund managers do create value found no evidence that the value 
created is passed onto investors rather than captured as rents.6 
After the 2008 financial crisis, investors seemed to wake up 
to these facts, as reflected in the rapid growth of lower fee index 
funds and passive exchange-traded funds.7 Nonetheless, roughly 
$10 trillion remains invested in actively managed mutual funds. 
That’s right: $10 trillion flowing through funds that charge fees 
 
 3 See, for example, Richard W. Sias, Institutional Herding, 17 Rev Fin Stud 165, 
167 (2004). 
 4 Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, Luck versus Skill in the Cross-Section of 
Mutual Fund Returns, 65 J Fin 1915, 1923 (2010). 
 5 Aye M. Soe and Ryan Poirier, SPIVA U.S. Scorecard: Mid-Year 2016 *1 (S&P 
Global 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/ZBA2-HVNP. 
 6 See Jonathan B. Berk and Jules H. van Binsbergen, Measuring Skill in the Mutual 
Fund Industry, 118 J Fin Econ 1, 16 (2015) (finding that the average mutual fund manager 
does create value but that “the average net alpha across all funds is not significantly dif-
ferent from zero, so there is no evidence that investors share in the fruits of this skill”). 
 7 For why this raises new concerns, see Charles Stein, Active vs. Passive Investing 
(Bloomberg, Dec 4, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/JRN7-5J6B. 
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that in nine out of ten cases swamp any value provided.8 That 
market and those fees are what’s at stake in this case. 
Mutual funds sold to the public, whether open or closed, ac-
tive or passive, are regulated as “registered investment compa-
nies,” a status created by the Investment Company Act of 1940.9 
This Act imposes a range of requirements on such funds while 
largely exempting private funds, such as hedge funds and private 
equity funds, sold only to institutions and very wealthy individu-
als. The notion that investment advisers have “a fiduciary duty 
with respect to the receipt of compensation for services” was added 
as § 36(b) of the Act in 1970.10 A little more than a decade later, 
the Second Circuit held in Gartenberg v Merrill Lynch Asset 
Management, Inc11 that this obligation included a duty not to 
charge excessive fees for the services provided and promulgated 
a six-factor test for determining whether fees are excessive.12 
Most courts subsequently confronted with a § 36(b) claim have 
followed some version of the Gartenberg test.13 Section 36(b) lia-
bility was thus a largely settled, even if not particularly satisfy-
ing, area of law until 2009. 
B. The Seventh Circuit Debate 
In 2009, Judge Easterbrook and two colleagues heard an ap-
peal from Jerry Jones and other owners of Oakmark mutual 
funds claiming that the adviser to Oakmark funds had breached 
its § 36(b) fiduciary obligations.14 Judge Easterbrook agreed with 
the lower court that the case should be dismissed, but he also 
went out of his way to “disapprove” of the Gartenberg standard 
 
 8 In previous work, I’ve offered a novel explanation for the amount of money flowing 
into such funds, suggesting that we can best understand these decisions as influenced by 
stock brokers and other intermediaries, who regularly help retail investors wade through 
the nearly ten thousand mutual fund choices available, and who earn extra when their 
clients buy expensive funds. See Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U Chi L Rev 
573, 588 (2015); Kathryn Judge, Fee Effects, 98 Iowa L Rev 1517, 1527 (2013). 
 9 54 Stat 789, codified at 15 USC § 80a-1 et seq. 
 10 15 USC § 80a-35(b); Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub L No 91-
547, 84 Stat 1413, 1429, codified in various sections of Title 15 (emphasis added). 
 11 694 F2d 923 (2d Cir 1982). 
 12 Id at 929–30. 
 13 See Jones v Harris Associates, 559 US 335, 343–44 (2010) (noting that “until the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision below, something of a consensus had developed regarding the 
standard set forth over 25 years ago in Gartenberg”). 
 14 Jones v Harris Associates, 527 F3d 627, 629 (7th Cir 2008). 
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relied on by the district court.15 According to Easterbrook, “A fi-
duciary duty differs from rate regulation.”16 In his assessment, 
this means that Section 36(b) creates a robust disclosure require-
ment and outlaws chicanery, but otherwise leaves to market 
forces the task of limiting the fees that mutual fund advisers 
charge their clients. He buttressed this position by analogizing 
the process through which mutual fund adviser fees are set to the 
processes establishing executive compensation. And he concluded 
by pointing to evidence that hedge fund managers are paid far 
more than mutual fund managers, making it “hard to conclude 
that Harris’s fees must be excessive.”17 
The opinion has many Posner-like characteristics. It is cou-
rageous. It raises questions beyond those presented by the parties. 
It opts for a sweeping holding when a narrower one would suffice. 
And it does so in the spirit of improving the law. In Easterbrook’s 
view, a fiduciary obligation, even one specific to compensation, is 
not sufficient to entangle judges in the messy business of second-
guessing a price set in a market that, at least in some dimensions, 
is exceptionally competitive. 
Judge Posner disagreed. He disagreed with Judge 
Easterbrook’s reading of earlier Seventh Circuit cases, he disa-
greed with Easterbrook’s failure to circulate the opinion prior to 
creating a circuit split, and, most importantly, he disagreed with 
Easterbrook’s assumption that market forces could be relied on to 
keep fees in check. 
Before going too deeply into Posner’s opinion, it is worth re-
calling the setting in which he was writing. It was 2009. This was 
the year after Bear Stearns and AIG were bailed out, after 
Lehman Brothers failed, and after markets went into a tailspin. 
It was also deep into the greatest recession the country had expe-
rienced since the Great Depression. Americans were losing jobs 
and facing record numbers of foreclosures. The narrative of the 
crisis was that the system is rigged; the rich get richer as the poor 
get poorer. Wall Street gets saved while Main Street suffers. 
Bankers had brought the country to the brink with their greed 
and shenanigans, yet not one was going to jail for it. It was in this 
environment that Judge Posner read Judge Easterbrook’s opinion 
 
 15 Id at 632. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id at 634. 
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about the power of market forces and the problems of judicial in-
tervention. It was against this background that Posner set about 
crafting a very different narrative. 
“You want to talk executive compensation?” Posner asks. “Al-
right, let’s look at executive compensation.” Let’s examine the 
“growing indications that executive compensation in large pub-
licly traded firms often is excessive because of the feeble incentives 
of boards of directors to police compensation.”18 Note how much is 
packed into this sentence. According to Posner, executive compen-
sation is broken. CEOs, Posner tells us, are “often” paid too much. 
This is not just an acknowledgment that markets are imperfect; 
it is a suggestion that they are flawed. And those flaws are evi-
denced in research documented in works about “Pay without 
Performance” and “Cronyism,” and summed up in newspaper ar-
ticles on “the Imperial CEO” and how “In the Boardroom, Every 
Back Gets Scratched.”19 Posner then goes on to explain why 
Easterbrook’s assumptions, ones that Posner might once have 
shared, have been revealed to be so erroneous. He talks about 
boardrooms full of executives who have a greater interest in pro-
tecting a world order that allows for excessive compensation and 
the way that compensation consulting is used to let boards off the 
hook for those decisions. 
Posner goes on to explain: “Competition in product and capi-
tal markets can’t be counted on to solve the problem because the 
same structure of incentives operates on all large corporations 
and similar entities, including mutual funds.”20 He quotes re-
search on mutual funds finding that “business connections can 
mitigate agency conflicts,” but they can also function as “channels 
for inefficient favoritism.”21 This is Posner not just giving voice to 
the plaintiffs in the suit, but speaking to the frustrations with 
finance that permeated public discourse in the aftermath of the 
 
 18 Jones v Harris Associates, 537 F3d 728, 730 (2008) (Posner dissenting from denial 
of rehearing en banc) (emphasis added). 
 19 Id, citing Lucian Bebchuck and Jesse Fried, Pay without Performance: The 
Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation 23–44 (Harvard 2004); Ivan E. Brick, Oded 
Palmon, and John K. Wald, CEO Compensation, Director Compensation, and Firm 
Performance: Evidence of Cronyism?, 12 J Corp Fin 403 (2006); Gary Wilson, How to Rein 
in the Imperial CEO, Wall St J A15 (July 9, 2008); Ben Stein, In the Boardroom, Every 
Back Gets Scratched, NY Times B9 (Apr 6, 2008). 
 20 Jones, 537 F3d at 730. 
 21 Id, quoting Camelia M. Kuhnen, Social Networks, Corporate Governance and 
Contracting in the Mutual Fund Industry (unpublished manuscript, Jan 4, 2006), archived 
at http://perma.cc/L93Y-D2TR, subsequently published as Business Networks, Corporate 
Governance, and Contracting in the Mutual Fund Industry, 64 J Fin 2185 (2009). 
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housing market crash. And he’s frank about the importance of the 
timing. As he explains, “Mutual funds are a component of the fi-
nancial services industry, where abuses have been rampant” and 
are “more evident now.”22 He is talking about finance as a site of 
bad behavior, a domain in which market processes and partici-
pants cannot be trusted. He is implicitly invoking the crisis to say 
that we now know better. Market forces are not just imperfect, as 
Easterbrook concedes; they are flawed. “The governance struc-
ture that enables mutual fund advisers to charge exorbitant fees 
is industry-wide.”23 Exorbitant fees. Exorbitant. 
Posner need not have gone this far. He could have noted that 
Easterbrook’s approach created a circuit split and merited further 
consideration accordingly. Instead, Posner took Easterbrook’s 
narrative as his starting point, and he flipped that narrative on 
its head. Like the good pragmatist he purports to be, Posner used 
experience rather than theory as his starting point. And he tells 
us that experience shows that the system is corrupt. Executives 
are overpaid; finance is full of tricksters. So maybe, just maybe, 
there is a role for the judiciary after all. 
To be sure, Posner does not provide a satisfying explanation 
of what § 36(b) obligations ought to entail or of the appropriate 
role of courts in adjudicating excessive fee claims. In taking 
Easterbrook’s opinion as a starting point, he also reiterates a 
range of institutionally flawed analogies. There may be agency 
costs and other flaws in both the processes through which execu-
tive compensation and mutual fund fees are established, but 
those processes are sufficiently different that the comparison 
probably adds more confusion than clarity to the matter. None-
theless, putting the opinion—or rather dissent—in context ex-
cuses at least some of these flaws. Not all opinions can or should 
serve the same function. Posner doesn’t have the votes to make 
law. All he has is the opportunity to explain why the case merits 
further attention—why the opinion, as decided, is wrong. And 
knowing full well that his court sits one step down from the top of 
the federal judicial hierarchy, his aim seems clear: explain to 
those up above why they should agree to hear the case. 
 
 22 Jones, 537 F3d at 730. 
 23 Id at 732.  
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C. SCOTUS Chimes In 
The Supreme Court did indeed grant certiorari in Harris to 
resolve the question of the fiduciary obligations that a mutual 
fund adviser owes pursuant to § 36(b). Consistent with Supreme 
Court Rule 10, and the structural understanding of the judicial 
system underlying this Essay, that decision reflected a view by at 
least four members of the Court that the state of the law, not the 
correctness or incorrectness of the decision below, justified the 
Court’s attention.24 In further recognition of the distinct role of 
the Supreme Court, academics, industry groups, and others, in-
cluding the Solicitor General, submitted sixteen amici briefs in 
which they provided thorough analyses of the issues at stake.25 As 
one of these briefs, submitted by a group of law professors, ex-
plained: “By declining to define ‘fiduciary duty’ in Section 36(b), 
. . . Congress ceded to the federal courts the duty of imbuing this 
concept with operational meaning.”26 Judging by the Court’s opin-
ion, this exhortation fell largely on deaf ears. 
In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Samuel Alito, 
the Court rejected Judge Easterbrook’s approach.27 The Court 
concluded that Gartenberg “has provided a workable standard for 
nearly three decades,” and should accordingly be affirmed as the 
appropriate standard.28 It did so despite the fact, acknowledged 
by Justice Clarence Thomas in concurrence, that in those three 
decades, “no excessive fee suit has ever produced a verdict for 
plaintiffs.”29 As further pointed out by Justice Thomas in concur-
rence,30 the Court also failed to address directly the tension be-
tween the language in Gartenberg, which seems to empower 
courts to exercise significant judgment with respect to the fair-
ness of fees charged, with many subsequent lower court decisions 
that take a much narrower approach despite paying lip service to 
Gartenberg. 
 
 24 US S Ct Rule 10 (“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the 
asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly 
stated rule of law.”). 
 25 For a list of amici briefs, see Jones v Harris Associates (SCOTUSblog), archived at 
http://perma.cc/R7A4-JCHU. 
 26 Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners, Jones v Harris 
Associates, No 08-586, *9 (US filed June 15, 2009) (emphasis added). 
 27 Jones, 559 US at 353. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Quinn Curtis and John Morley, An Empirical Study of Mutual Fund Excessive Fee 
Litigation: Do the Merits Matter?, 30 J L Econ & Org 275, 277 (2014). 
 30 Jones, 559 US at 354 (Thomas concurring). 
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The vagueness that permeates much of the opinion gives way 
to clarity on one point. The Supreme Court disapproved of the 
back and forth between Easterbrook and Posner below. In Justice 
Alito’s view, “The debate between the Seventh Circuit panel and 
the dissent from the denial of rehearing regarding today’s mutual 
fund market is a matter for Congress, not the courts.”31 In his 
view, it seems, examining the mutual fund marketplace in order 
to understand the context in which mutual fund fees are set and 
the effect of excessive fee litigation on that process is not a matter 
for judges, or at least not in the way Easterbrook and Posner 
approached it. 
II.  PUTTING JONES IN CONTEXT 
As the extensive briefing reflects, there were a number of im-
portant issues before the Court in Jones.32 The Court’s opinion 
answered few of them. In a piece summed up in its title, The 
Downside of Judicial Restraint: The (Non-)Effect of Jones v. 
Harris, Professor John Coates bemoans that in “cho[osing] to give 
little additional meaningful guidance to lower courts on what fac-
tors to use” when evaluating a § 36(b) claim, the “primary benefi-
ciaries” of the Supreme Court’s decision are likely to be lawyers 
who bring and defend against such claims.33 In other subsequent 
work, Professors Quinn Curtis and John Morley explain the myr-
iad reasons that even after Jones, “[e]xcessive fee liability has 
been implemented so poorly that the questions about its abstract 
value are almost beside the point.”34 In companion empirical 
work, they find that the size of a fund adviser is a more powerful 
predictor of whether it has faced suit than the relative size of the 
fees it charges. “[A]nd perhaps most importantly,” they “found no 
evidence that fees declined in funds after they had been targeted 
by § 36(b) suits. This is disappointing,” given that one “goal of 
§ 36(b) is . . . to reduce fees going forward.”35 
Given how little impact Jones seems to have had on § 36(b) 
litigation, it might be tempting to dismiss the case, and Posner’s 
role in it, as having little import. Why bother writing a heated 
dissent from a petition that is usually denied as a matter of 
course? Why anger colleagues and invite censure from the 
 
 31 Id at 353. 
 32 See Curtis and Morley, 32 Yale J Reg at 3–4 (cited in note 2). 
 33 Coates, 6 Duke J Const L & Pub Pol at 59–60 (cited in note 2). 
 34 Curtis and Morley, 32 Yale J Reg at 4 (cited in note 2). 
 35 Id at 12. 
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Supreme Court? The remainder of this Essay explores why, for 
Posner, there was no other way. And, by examining the three 
opinions in Jones in context, it suggests that the law is better off 
because of it. 
A. An Aside 
I do not write as a dispassionate observer of Judge Posner. I 
write, instead, as a former clerk, one who can still vividly recall 
where I was sitting in the Stanford Law library when I opened an 
email from Judge Posner inviting me to come interview for a 
clerkship in his chambers. Time froze. And in ways that I could 
not have fathomed at the time, my response to that email set off 
a chain of events that transformed the rest of my life. Although I 
will not recount here the many reasons I am forever indebted to 
Judge Posner, that gratitude inevitably colors my analysis. I 
smile whenever I read his words, never quite sure if it is because 
of the beauty of his prose or the way those words bring him to life 
before me. I raise this not only to admit my biases, but because 
specific experiences I had as a clerk shape my understanding of 
Judge Posner, and sharing a few such moments can shed helpful 
additional light on who he is and how he judged. 
By the time I received that fateful email, Posner was a leg-
end. He was a larger-than-life figure who could loom across con-
tinents. This meant that when Posner the Man walked into a 
room, he had to grapple with the presence of Posner the Legend. 
He might well have enjoyed this at times, but for someone so ea-
ger to learn and engage, legendary status can also take away the 
fun. The last thing he wanted was to spend time with otherwise 
intelligent people rendered mute by his glow. So, consciously or 
not, Judge Posner had devised a set of tools to help ensure that 
Posner the Legend remained life-sized in conversation, at least 
when it suited him. I still recall how witty I felt when he seemed 
to laugh heartily during my interview. Any self-satisfaction dis-
appeared soon after I joined chambers, as I observed him use that 
same laugh time and again to put others at ease in hopes they 
might then become more interesting. I told myself that if I were 
ever to write a biography of Richard A. Posner, which I won’t, I 
would title it “Dick’s Laugh,” for that laugh, along with his unu-
sual insistence that his clerks address him by his first name—and 
a nickname at that—embody his unique approach to judging. As 
a judge, he was a pragmatist and a visionary, as all know, but he 
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was a particular breed of pragmatic visionary, one who knew 
where he stood, or at least had some sense of those contours. 
B. Three Opinions, Three Approaches to Judging 
With this background, we can revisit the three opinions in 
Jones, stylizing each approach just a bit and putting each in con-
text, to consider the role of different actors in the judicial system 
given the aim of “good” law. The claim is that the occasional in-
stigator is a good thing for the law. 
1. The initial instigator. 
In Jones v Harris Associates,36 Judge Easterbrook plays a role 
that Posner often plays—instigator. Confronted with a case that 
could easily be resolved without stirring any feathers, Easterbrook 
used the case as an opportunity to step back and consider what 
was at stake and how the law had gotten to its current state. To 
paraphrase, he said, “I recognize the word ‘fiduciary,’ and based 
on my three decades on the bench, I don’t think it can bear the 
load that Gartenberg places on it. I also know something about 
markets, and something about judges, and those experiences sug-
gest that markets are far better than judges at determining the 
appropriate price to pay for mutual fund advisory services. 
Congress does seem to want courts to play a role, but that role is 
best understood as complementing a market-based regime by en-
suring that advisers disclose what they charge and don’t engage 
in tricks. So I will uphold the decision of the district court, but I 
will also use the case to promulgate a new view of the law.” 
There are weaknesses to a judge instigating in this fashion. 
There is a risk of disruption and distraction, particularly if there 
are too many trying to play this role. The law often exists as it 
does for a reason. But put in the context of a multilayered legal 
system, there are also real benefits to judges occasionally playing 
this role. In purporting to provide answers, Easterbrook was ask-
ing questions central to § 36(b) yet relatively unaddressed in the 
decades of litigation invoking it. 
The law can stagnate when no one is willing to stick her neck 
out and ask the tough questions. Sometimes the role of instigators 
is to draw attention to the ways in which new developments, new 
insights, or changing mores render the state of the law ill suited 
 
 36 527 F3d 627 (7th Cir 2008).  
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to the tasks at hand. Other times, the role of an instigator is to 
question whether there was ever a method to the madness em-
bodied in established doctrine. Law is sometimes the byproduct 
of thoughtful reflection and application, but it can also spread 
through inadvertence and inattention. Judges are busy. Dicta in 
one case can become a holding in the next and all that follow with-
out anyone raising the first-order questions that animated 
Easterbrook and Posner in Jones. In an imperfect system, insti-
gators can make it more likely that there is a method to the mad-
ness. The extensive secondary literature on § 36(b) suggests that 
excessive fee litigation was imposing real costs on large mutual 
funds without having much of a beneficial impact on fee levels. 
Given the massive growth of mutual funds and other develop-
ments since 1982 when Gartenberg was decided, the appropriate 
contours of § 36(b) liability merited more consideration than they 
had received.37 
2. Posner as instigator. 
Let’s now turn to Posner, and what makes him such a valua-
ble instigator. Posner was not the initial instigator in Jones, but 
he was an instigator. He exercised his vote and voice in a proce-
dural setting when such tools are rarely used. He was not as-
signed to Jones. He had the option of staying out of the matter 
completely. But he didn’t. Instead, he authored an opinion that 
had no legal force for little reason other than to explain why the 
case mattered and why the opinion should not stand. This took 
time, attention, and the willingness to offend a colleague. We can 
never know the counterfactual, but we do know that his gambit 
worked. His opinion helped get the attention of the public and of the 
Supreme Court, leading to the reversal of Easterbrook’s opinion. 
Although speculative, it is possible that Posner’s gambit had 
other payoffs as well. Academics are again taking up the question 
of the appropriate role of law in checking mutual fund fees.38 
 
 37 See generally, for example, Morley and Curtis, 120 Yale L J 84 (cited in note 2); 
Coates, 6 Duke J Const L & Pub Pol 58 (cited in note 2). See also William A. Birdthistle, 
Investment Indiscipline: A Behavioral Approach to Mutual Fund Jurisprudence, 2010 U 
Ill L Rev 61, 87; Curtis and Morley, 32 Yale J Reg at 3 (cited in note 2); Brief of Law and 
Finance Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Jones v Harris Associates, No 08-586, *13 
(US filed Sept 3, 2009); Brief for Amici Curiae, Professor Deborah A. DeMott and Professor 
Mark L. Ascher, in Support of Petitioners, Jones v Harris Associates, No 08-586, *23 (US 
filed June 17, 2009); John C. Coates IV and R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual 
Fund Industry: Evidence and Implications for Policy, 33 J Corp L 151, 154 (2007). 
 38 See notes 2, 29. 
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Moreover, since 2009, there has been a significant shift from ac-
tively managed mutual funds to more cost-effective alternatives 
like index funds. The crisis surely helped spur this shift, and the 
trend started before Jones, so other forces are at play.39 Nonethe-
less, the trend is more pronounced in the United States than else-
where, leaving open the possibility that Jones may have played a 
contributory role in drawing the public’s attention to the mis-
match between the fees they were paying and the value they were 
receiving.40 
Returning to his influence inside the judicial system, Posner 
is a self-identified pragmatist. For him, pragmatism is “an ap-
proach to decision making that emphasizes consequences over 
doctrine”41 and pragmatic judges are “[j]udges who don’t insist 
that a legalistic algorithm will decide every case.”42 Pragmatism 
as he practiced it thus means both a way of judging and a way of 
owning those judgments. One cannot be separated from the other. 
This understanding of what judges ought to do goes to the 
core of Posner’s sometimes harsh exchanges with Justice Scalia. 
In Posner’s view, the law does not just allow, but requires, judges 
to exercise judgment. This does not mean ignoring text or prece-
dent. It is about the need for law, statutory or otherwise, to be 
interpreted, brought to life, and given meaning by judges. It is 
about a legal system that relies on judges who are human and 
who see the humanity of those before and around them. It is about 
being willing to exercise judgment and being frank about those 
judgments. 
Posner doesn’t engage in subterfuge, well-meaning or other-
wise, when deciding a case. He makes his rationales plain, allow-
ing other judges, other lawmakers, and anyone else who might be 
interested, to assess for themselves the issues at stake. This 
comes through in Jones, in Posner’s embrace of what the crisis 
revealed regarding the pervasive problems plaguing finance.43 It 
also comes through in his willingness to look to recent work on 
the myriad reasons that market forces cannot be trusted as fully 
 
 39 See Vladyslav Sushko and Grant Turner, The Implications of Passive Investing for 
Securities Markets, March Bank Intl Settlements Q Rev 113, 117–19 (2018). 
 40 See id at 116. 
 41 Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 Cal L Rev 
519, 539 (2012). 
 42 Id. 
 43 Jones v Harris Associates, 537 F3d 728, 730–31 (2008) (Posner dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc). 
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as he himself once believed. He was capable of having his think-
ing evolve in light of new evidence, and his assessment of the is-
sues before him shaped by the zeitgeist of the moment, because 
that is part of what he assumed a good judge does. He looked at 
the text, but he did not blind himself to realities apparent only by 
looking away from the text to the litigants before the court and to 
the world that surrounds them all. 
To be sure, there are plenty of risks in allowing Easterbrook, 
Posner, or others to instigate in this manner. The most pressing 
may be that in embracing some judicial diversity, similar litigants 
may face different outcomes, undermining one sense of fairness 
that is obviously core to the judiciary. Instigating, however, need 
not affect outcomes. At least some of the time, when Posner took 
on this role, and the law as it stood was at odds with what he 
thought it ought to be, he followed precedent while flagging 
(sometimes successfully) why the law was suboptimal.44 Simi-
larly, here, the plaintiffs would have lost regardless of the test 
used to dismiss their claims. 
More importantly, ensuring comparable outcomes in compa-
rable cases is but one measure of fairness. Ensuring that all liti-
gants receive outcomes consistent with the aims and design of the 
law governing their actions is another. Recognizing the many rea-
sons the law on the books can vary from this notion of “good” cre-
ates a space, a need, for instigators even if it does mean some var-
iation in outcomes. The analysis here further suggests that, 
because no judge is omniscient regarding a law’s aims or effects, 
a pragmatist who openly questions a law’s aims and effects, and 
who does so from a position that is grounded in experience rather 
than purporting to derive legitimacy from on high, may play a 
particularly important role in instigating reconsideration of cur-
rent doctrine. 
 
 44 See, for example, Khan v State Oil Co, 93 F3d 1358, 1363 (7th Cir 1996) (adhering 
to Supreme Court precedent despite criticizing its “increasingly wobbly, moth-eaten foun-
dations”—an approach praised by the Supreme Court when it subsequently overruled its 
precedent in State Oil Co v Kahn, 522 US 3, 20 (1997)); Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin 
v Doyle, 162 F3d 463, 479–80 (7th Cir 1998) (holding unconstitutional a Wisconsin law 
criminalizing partial-birth abortion under the Supreme Court’s settled “undue burden” 
standard, but nevertheless noting aspects of the law that would fail rational basis re-
view—reasoning adopted in part by a Supreme Court majority in Stenberg v Carhart, 530 
US 914, 952 (2000)). 
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3. Why stick my neck out when there’s a nice hole in front 
of me? 
The increasingly normalized sense that judges should not ex-
ercise judgment comes through in Justice Alito’s chiding of both 
Easterbrook and Posner.45 Neither suggests a reading of § 36(b) 
that ignores the text. They were offering alternative readings of 
that text. Even Easterbrook, who was closer to the line, grounds 
much of his analysis on the meaning of a term—fiduciary—which 
has long been brought to life through judicial lawmaking.46 It is 
also a term, as Justice Alito’s opinion otherwise highlights, that 
has been given different meanings depending on the context, leav-
ing courts no way to avoid the task of making meaning in inter-
preting it.47 To be sure, both looked beyond the text to factors that 
Justice Alito viewed as inappropriate, but whether judges should 
ever look up from the page is the question at stake in the analysis 
here. 
True to his critique, Justice Alito’s attention does not stray 
too far from the text. And, rather than forging new ground, 
Justice Alito hews closely to an unsatisfying and ambiguous sta-
tus quo. This is different than Cass Sunstein–style minimalism, 
though it might be taken for such. Minimalism is about scope. The 
compromises that degrade Justice Alito’s opinion arise not from 
its narrowness but from its vagueness. As Professor Coates nicely 
summarizes: “In enacting section 36(b), Congress gave the federal 
courts an unappetizing job: to discern limits based on a vaguely 
stated standard on compensation in what is clearly both a con-
flicted but also competitive context. That job necessarily involves 
exercise of judicial discretion.”48 The Court’s opinion was deficient 
because it “punt[ed] the entire shapeless mess of section 36(b) back 
to the federal district courts” and “squashed the nascent effort by 
the Seventh Circuit to begin th[e] process” of “attempt[ing] to put 
some order on the chaos invited by the statutory standard.”49 
Whatever Congress intended § 36(b) to achieve, it cannot ful-
fill that role unless it has sufficient flesh for its limits to be cog-
nizable to courts and, more importantly, to the boards of directors 
 
 45 Jones v Harris Associates, 559 US 335, 353 (2010) (“The debate between the 
Seventh Circuit panel and the dissent from the denial of rehearing regarding today’s mu-
tual fund market is a matter for Congress, not the courts.”). 
 46 See Jones, 527 F3d at 632. 
 47 See Jones, 559 US at 345–47. 
 48 Coates, 6 Duke J Const L & Pub Pol at 64 (cited in note 2). 
 49 Id. 
2019] Judges and Judgment: In Praise of Instigators 1093 
 
of mutual funds. For it is in the boardroom that § 36(b) will suc-
ceed or fail in having some impact on the fees that mutual funds, 
and investors in those funds, pay for advisory services. This is 
why Coates is so frustrated. And empirical work, by Coates and 
others, suggests reason for concern. Recall that Quinn and 
Morley’s findings suggest that § 36(b) hasn’t been helpful in re-
ducing fees even at those funds that are sued.50 Section 36(b) may 
never be a panacea for mutual fund investors, and excessive fee 
litigation is not suited to be the primary tool for ensuring that mu-
tual fund advisers charge reasonable fees, but Congress added the 
section for a reason. Although Justice Alito rejected Easterbrook’s 
effort to read it out of the scheme, Justice Alito also turned away 
from the opportunity—recognized as such by amici on both sides 
of the issue—to provide much-needed guidance regarding how 
§ 36(b) ought to function. 
In trying to avoid exercising the judgment required to provide 
meaningful guidance regarding when the fees a fund adviser 
charges are so high as to violate § 36(b), Justice Alito is like a 
worker saving for retirement who refuses to place his money in 
anything other than a savings account at his local, FDIC-insured 
bank. He may be protected from bank failure and the vagaries of 
the market, but he is ultimately setting himself (but in this case, 
the law) up to fail. He is allowing inflation to eat away at his 
spending power and forgoing an opportunity to diversify into as-
sets that, while individually risky, have over time consistently 
provided the much higher returns most workers need in order to 
aggregate the wealth needed to enjoy retirement. Sometimes 
what seems like the safe path is actually a path toward a slow 
death. Posner and Easterbrook took positions that recognized 
this. 
The Supreme Court sits at a different place in the legal sys-
tem, and greater modesty may be warranted accordingly. But 
modesty can mean many things, and the type of modesty that the 
Court increasingly insists on exercising may in time do more 
harm than good. Congress sometimes wants judges, and regula-
tors, to exercise judgment. There is no reason a priori that avoid-
ing such commands is any less disrespectful of Congress than de-
cisions to ignore the text altogether. 
 
 50 See Curtis and Morley, 32 Yale J Reg at 4 (cited in note 2). 
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Justice Alito seems to suggest that Posner crossed a line in 
looking beyond the text to understand the text.51 The opinion ech-
oes a seemingly growing consensus that judges can and should be 
dispassionate, distant, and objective to the point of removing who 
they are from the judicial process. There is something appealing 
about this in the abstract. Wouldn’t the law be fairer, after all, if 
all those applying it did so uniformly, in a manner more akin to a 
robot than a human? 
The Judge Posner I got to know as a clerk never clung to such 
illusions. He may have appeared cold to those paying heed to the 
wrong cues, and like most members of the federal judiciary and 
most educated white males of his generation, he enjoyed privi-
leges of the kind that can blind. But this is when Judge Posner 
the judge cannot be divorced from Dick Posner the person. Both 
were constantly observing, and they were remarkably attuned to 
what they saw. When deciding a suit challenging a health in-
surer’s refusal to cover bariatric surgery for an insured, Judge 
Posner rendered a short opinion applying established law and de-
ferring to the insurer’s determination.52 But, if I may, he did so 
only after he contemplated and opened himself up to what the 
decision may mean for the insured. He reflected on the gait and 
possible discomfort of some of the larger individuals that he saw 
walking along the beach in Michigan where he spent many a 
weekend. He followed the law but not blindly. 
In addition to seeing those before him, Posner saw himself. 
Although no one would ever accuse Judge Posner of being a man 
of the people, he was at least aware that he was not. I recall him 
discussing over lunch the bubble in which he and his colleagues 
lived. He saw it symbolized in how they moved from home to 
work. As he explained it, in contrast to most who worked in the 
Dirksen Building who relied on public transportation, most 
judges drove. They did so because they had the privilege of park-
ing in a lot directly underneath the building. Upon exiting their 
vehicles, they were then shuttled up the building in an elevator 
reserved just for members of the judiciary. They could thus move 
from the comfort of their homes to chambers without interacting 
with anyone, except the guards who ensured their safety, or tak-
ing so much as a breath of fresh air. He told the story with the 
 
 51 See Jones, 559 US at 353. 
 52 Manny v Central States, SE and SW Areas Pension and Health and Welfare Funds, 
388 F3d 241, 246–47 (7th Cir 2004). 
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express point of conveying just how insulated a life it is to be a 
federal judge. He was the butt of the story. 
Judge Posner may have said more absurd things than any 
other member of the federal judiciary during his time on the 
bench. As closely as he looked at the world, and as much as he 
saw, there was a lot he didn’t understand. He too is human and 
has biases that do not always serve him. But he never invoked 
the illusion that any man-made institution, be it Congress or the 
judiciary, could be anything other than flawed and human to ob-
scure the fact that in each and every case, he was a human being 
applying man-made law in a way that would affect human beings 
and the evolution of the law. 
It has become trendy for people of power to deny that they 
have it. Jesse Eisenger made this point with respect to prosecu-
tors, who never charged any top executive despite all of the seem-
ing misdeeds in the years leading up to 2008, but the story doesn’t 
stop there.53 CEOs blame shareholders and a skewed interpreta-
tion of the law to pretend that they lack agency when making de-
cisions that harm workers or others.54 The President blames 
Congress when carrying out an enforcement policy that separates 
children from their parents at the border.55 The Treasury Secretary 
and Chair of the Federal Reserve blame a lack of legal authority 
for the decision to allow Lehman Brothers to fail, despite the flex-
ibility they found in the law to save other institutions.56   
Justice Alito’s decision here is less extreme than these exam-
ples. The Jones decision was no great injustice. But that doesn’t 
render it harmless. When courts again and again duck the oppor-
tunity and obligation to forge law and provide useful clarity, they 
may shield themselves from protests, but they also may contrib-
ute to a slow erosion of trust in the judiciary.57 
 
 53 See generally Jesse Eisinger, The Chickenshit Club: Why the Justice Department 
Fails to Prosecute Executives (Simon & Schuster 2017). 
 54 Multiple CEOs of drug companies have recently explained massive increases in 
the pricing of critical drugs as obligated by duties to their shareholders. Chris Matyszczyk, 
Move Over, Martin Shkreli. This CEO Says It’s His “Moral” Imperative to Raise a Drug’s 
Price by 400 Percent (Inc., Sept 11, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/5HCX-QH9R. 
 55 Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Again Falsely Blames Democrats for His Separation 
Tactic (NY Times, June 16, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/KS4Z-XV5A. 
 56 Laurence M. Ball, Ten Years On, the Fed’s Failings on Lehman Brothers Are All 
Too Clear (The Guardian, Sept 3, 2018), available at http://perma.cc/Q43U-SBUT. 
 57 As Professor Lawrence Lessig has explained, we are at a historical moment when 
the public’s trust in institutions is faltering, in significant part because of a slow erosion, 
or “corruption,” of institutions that are meant to play important public roles. The combi-
nation of judicial avoidance with an exacerbated tendency to disguise the rationales for 
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CONCLUSION 
Small-c conservatism has an important role to play in the 
process of judging. Continuity and consistency in the law requires 
respect for text and adherence to precedent. We should all be 
grateful that the judiciary is not constituted of carbon copies of 
Judge Posner. But it is possible that we are locking up too much 
of the law in a savings account, only to have it diminish in stature 
and meaning over time. I am fearful that the tendency of so many, 
in and outside the law, to defer to institutions and commands as 
somehow outside themselves is contributing to a slow decay that 
is eating away at the social core of these bodies. 
Judges are not and should not be robots. What they do is not 
and cannot be rote. Judges at their best respect their role as some-
thing larger than themselves, deferring to text, precedent, and 
other constraints accordingly, but also embracing the humanity, 
quirks, and even warts of all of the constituents whose collective 
actions contribute to this corpus we call law. There will never be 
another judge like Judge Posner, but for the sake of the law, I 
hope that a few more life-sized, larger-than-life figures come to 
the fore. 
 
that avoidance may be contributing to this institutional corruption. Lawrence Lessig, 
America, Compromised 1–3 (Chicago 2018). 
